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In this paper we analyze tax and transfer choices in an OLG economy with capital
accumulation and endogenous growth coming from public investment, such as education.
We solve for a Markov perfect equilibrium when electoral competition targets the votes of
young and old households. We ﬁnd that when calibrating the model to match US data, it
predicts levels of intergenerational transfers and of public investments that are similar to the
observed ones. Furthermore the Ramsey policy for the same parameters would call for both
generations to be taxed to ﬁnance public investment. If the political process internalized the
beneﬁts that public investment has on future generations, growth would be twice as high as
currently observed.
JEL Classiﬁcation Code: E62, H55, O41
1 Introduction
In developed countries, intergenerational transfers are much larger than intragenerational ones.
Data from the OECD shows that for every dollar of government spending spent on transfers
for middle-aged individuals, 62 cents are spent per child aged 0−14, and 2.85 dollars are spent
on the old. Thus the ratio of intergenerational transfers to intragenerational ones is almost
3.5.1 Within developed nations, there are substantial diﬀerences in the relative sizes of these
transfers. The UK destines 2.13 pounds to the elderly for every pound spent on the middle
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1To complete the comparison we need to include public investment in infrastructure decomposing its contem-
poraneous and long-term impact. According to the literature on the impact of infrastructure on growth, the
long-term impact is more important.
1aged, and Italy spends slightly more on per child than per middle aged. The ratio of spending
per elderly individual to spending per child varies from 2.3 in Japan and Sweden to 3.8i nI t a l y
and the US.
We know that the level of public investment in infrastructure and public education has a
signiﬁcant impact on a countrys long-run growth performance.2 Therefore it seems a relevant
taskto explore the determinants of the wide disparities in policy choice, and growth performance,
observed across countries. One way to proceed is to assume that policies are chosen collectively
according to some aggregation of preferences in society. If this is the case, then observed policy
diﬀerences can depend on diﬀerences in economic primitives, population characteristics and on
the details of the policy selection processes.
In this paper we set up a model that captures how population growth aﬀects political choices
and therefore growth. This is contrary to traditional models of endogenous growth (See Barro
Sala-i-Martin (1995) chapter 4) were population growth is found to have no eﬀect on long-run
growth. By considering ﬁnite horizons we introduce a tension between the middle aged and
the old about the value of public investments. The former might want to ﬁnance education
because they would live enough to reap part of the beneﬁts in the form of higher return to their
savings. But the latter receive little economic beneﬁt from public investments and are better oﬀ
supporting the introduction of direct transfers to them.
We introduce political choice of public investments and social security transfers in the Dia-
mond (1965) overlapping-generations frameworkwith production and capital accumulation with
endogenous growth. Households are assumed to be non-altruistic. As consumers, they are price
takers. As voters, they rationally take into account how policies aﬀect prices and future political
choices; furthermore, they are not bound by past political decisions. The politico-economic equi-
librium therefore features subgame-perfect tax and transfer choices that support a competitive
equilibrium.
We model electoral competition under the assumption of probabilistic voting rather than
a pivotal median voter. In equilibrium, vote-maximizing candidates aim at maximizing the
average welfare of all voters, not only of the median voter. We restrict attention to Markov
perfect equilibria where policy choices are only a function of the natural state variables. Political
competition results in lower public investment than what is optimal according to the Ramsey
2See Barro (1990) for a ﬁrst treatment, and Gerhard Glomm and B. Ravikumar 1997, JEDC, 21, , 183–204
for an OLG setting.
2plan. The political process does not fully internalize the positive impact of public investment
and therefore “wastes” public resources as transfers to the old.
2L i t e r a t u r e
2.1 Economics only, Public Investment in Endogenous Growth Models, Op-
timal Investment/Transfer Combination
Boldrin Montes (2005) show that in order to replicate a complete markets allocation when
capital markets are incomplete there is a need to use both social security and public education,
linking them in a certain way. This is one example of a new literature that tries to ﬁnd economic
and political reasons for the joint existence of social security and education. In any case it is
not clear why the complete markets allocation is the relevant benchmark, given the education
introduces a positive externality in the economy.
2.2 Politics, Intra-Generational Redistribution through Public Education
Gerhard Glomm and B. Ravikumar 1992, JPE, 100, 4, 818–834. This is a simple model in
which parents vote on whether public education should be provided and if so, at what tax
rate, or whether education should be privately provided by each household. This trade-oﬀ
is aﬀected by parents’ ability to bequeath human capital. Public education reduces income
inequality, but leads to lower long-run growth. There is no alternative policy instrument, and
no intergenerational conﬂict in this setup.
2.3 Politics, Inter-Generational Redistribution and Education/Investment
Bellettini Berti Ceroni (1999). The authors argue that although redistributive and growth-
oriented policies compete for scarce tax revenues, they might go hand in hand since the former
are needed to make growth socially palatable. Growth is driven by accumulation of public
capital; therefore more redistribution depresses growth. Without a linkbetween current and
past policy choices (static Nash) zero taxes are chosen. But if public capital is suﬃciently
productive subgame-perfect Nash equilibria based on trigger strategies (interpreted as a social
norm) can be supported. If SS is expected to be sustained tomorrow then young also want to
invest in public capital since this increases future wages. The setup is similar to the one we
develop in this paper. By adding probabilistic voting we increase the resistance against public
investments, and we eliminate trigger strategy equilibria.
3Rangel (2003). Model of intergenerational (IG) exchange to study the conditions under
which nonmarket institutions can generate Pareto-optimal levels of investment. Agents live
for three periods. Middle-aged decide on investment in forward IG good (FIG) that beneﬁts
future generations only. If the only decision made every period is how much to invest in FIGs, no
investment takes place. But a link to the provision of backward IG goods (BIG, for example, the
government transfers resources to the elderly through the social security system) can sustain the
provision of FIGs. Without backward exchange, investment in FIGs is ineﬃciently low; but with
it, even optimal investment by selﬁsh generations is possible. Linkages across games thus play
an important role in sustaining cooperation, as realized before in the literature on multimarket
contact in industrial organization. If a majority of the electorate receives positive beneﬁts from
keeping the social security system, there are voting equilibria in which even selﬁsh generations
vote to invest in FIGs. In these equilibria, investment in future generations is supported by
a linkbetween BIGs and FIGs: present voters correctly believe that future voters support of
social security depends on whether or not they invest in FIGs. This is another paper in the
above mentioned new literature on linkages between social security and education, stressing the
political side now.
2.4 Other
Poterba 1997/8: Using a panel of state level data in the US he shows that districts with more
elderly go hand in hand with less education spending.
3 The Model
We consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of (continua of) consumer-voters
that are economically and politically active for two periods, as workers (when young) and retirees
(when old). The gross population growth rate and thus, the ratio of young to old households,
equals ν. In each period, workers and retirees elect a government that runs an intergenerational
transfer scheme and undertakes public investment.
3.1 Production
A continuum of competitive ﬁrms transform capital and labor into output by means of a Cobb-





where B0 > 0 and the capital share α ∈ (0,1). Capital is owned by retirees and fully depreciates
after one period. The capital stockper retiree, st−1, therefore equals the per-capita savings of
workers in the previous period. Labor is supplied by current workers. Normalizing their time-
endowment to unity and denoting workers’ leisure consumption by xt, labor supply per retiree
equals ν(1 − xt). Note that we assume the exponents on labor input and the time-varying
component of productivity, At, to be the same. On a balanced-growth path, the ratio At/st−1
will therefore be constant.
Production factors are rewarded according to their marginal products, due to competition
among ﬁrms. The wage, wt, and the gross return on private capital, Rt, therefore satisfy









with α  ≡ α/(1 − α).
Productivity is endogenous, reﬂecting public investments during previous periods. More
speciﬁcally, we assume productivity growth to be a concave function of lagged public investment




with B1 > 0, δ ∈ (0,1), and It denoting public investment per retiree. The linkbetween
public investment and productivity growth can be interpreted in several ways. According to our
preferred interpretation, It and At represent publicly provided education and “human capital”,
respectively. According to this interpretation, households live for three periods although they
are economically and politically active only during the last two. As (very young) students,
households enjoy public education but do not consume nor worknor vote. In the following
period, as (young) workers, households contribute with their human capital both to production
and the formation of new human capital for the succeeding cohort.3 According to an alternative






5interpretation, It and At represent (investments into) public infrastructure.
3.2 Government
The government taxes labor income in period t at rate τt + σt + ξt and capital income at rate
ηt+θt. Revenues collected from workers fund transfers to retirees (the component corresponding
to τt), public investment (σt), as well as a lump-sum rebate to workers (ξt). The only role of ξt
therefore is to distort labor supply. Revenues collected from retirees fund transfers to workers
(the component corresponding to ηt) as well as public investment (θt). Denoting per-capita
transfers to workers and retirees by at and bt, respectively, we then have
at = wt(1 − xt)ξt + st−1Rtηt/ν = wt(1 − xt)(ξt + ηtα ),
bt = νwt(1 − xt)τt,
It = νwt(1 − xt)σt + st−1Rtθt = νwt(1 − xt)(σt + θtα ).
Tax rates must not exceed unity nor be negative (since we exclude lump-sum taxes): 0 ≤
τt+σt+ξt ≤ 1a n d0≤ ηt+θt ≤ 1 for all t. Further constraints follow from the requirement that
at, bt,a n dIt are positive. Taken together, these restrictions imply that the policy instruments
have to satisfy the following conditions:
ξt + ηtα  ≥ 0,τ t ≥ 0,σ t + θtα  ≥ 0,
1 ≥ τt + σt + ξt ≥ 0, 1 ≥ ηt + θt ≥ 0,
for all t. (1)
We denote a combination of the ﬁve instruments in period t as ¯ κt,¯ κt ≡ (τt,σ t,η t,θ t,ξ t).
Expressed as shares of GDP, public investment, net transfers to retirees, and net transfers
to workers are given by
investment share = (1 − α)(σt + θtα ),
share of transfers to retirees = (1 − α)(τt − (ηt + θt)α ),
share of transfers to workers = (1− α)(ηtα  − (τt + σt)),
respectively.
3.3 Consumers
Consumers value young- and old-age consumption as well as leisure and discount the future at
factor β ∈ (0,1). To enable us to characterize the equilibrium in closed form, we assume that the
6period utility function of consumption is logarithmic. The indirect utility function of a young




s.t.c 1,t = wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − σt − ξt)+at − st,
c2,t+1 = stRt+1(1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)+bt+1.
The felicity function of leisure is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave.
The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the households’ savings and labor-supply decisions
are standard. Conditional on factor prices, tax rates, and beneﬁts, the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between current and future consumption is equalized with the corresponding marginal rate
of transformation, the after-tax gross interest rate. Similarly, the marginal rate of substitution
between ﬁrst-period consumption and leisure is equalized with the after-tax wage:
1
c1,t








Due to our assumption of logarithmic preferences over consumption, the Euler equation char-
acterizing the optimal savings choice of an individual household yields a closed-form solution for
the aggregate savings function that maps the disposable income of a cohort as well as anticipated
future tax rates into that cohort’s savings:4
st = z(τt+1,η t+1,θ t+1)wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − σt + ηtα ),
where we deﬁne
z(τt+1,η t+1,θ t+1) ≡
αβ(1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)
α(1 + β)(1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)+( 1− α)τt+1
≥ 0.
4To see this, note that the optimal savings choice of an individual consumer is characterized (from the Euler
equation above) by
stRt+1(1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)+bt+1 = βRt+1(1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)[wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − σt − ξt)+at − st].
Substituting for beneﬁts and factor prices (and setting individual and aggregate savings equal to each other), we
arrive at
stRt+1(1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)+νwt+1(1 − xt+1)τt+1 = βRt+1(1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)[wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − σt + ηtα
 ) − st],
⇒ (1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)+τt+1/α
  = β(1 − ηt+1 − θt+1)[wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − σt + ηtα
 )/st − 1].
The last equation yields a closed-form solution for the ﬁxed-point problem, i.e., the aggregate savings function.
73.4 Economic Equilibrium
For convenience, we workwith the state variables At and qt ≡ A1−α
t sα
t−1 rather than the “orig-
inal” state variables At and st−1. Substituting the expressions for wages and returns into the
consumers’ optimality conditions, the equilibrium allocation can recursively be expressed in
terms of the following functions of policy instruments:
st = B0(1 − α)ν−α qt (1 − xt)1−α (1 − τt − σt + ηtα )z(τt+1,η t+1,θ t+1),
c1,t = B0(1 − α)ν−α qt (1 − xt)1−α (1 − τt − σt + ηtα )(1 − z(τt+1,η t+1,θ t+1)),
c2,t = B0ν1−α qt (1 − xt)1−α (α(1 − ηt − θt)+( 1− α)τt),
xt = x(τt,σ t,η t,ξ t,τ t+1,η t+1,θ t+1),
At+1 = B1 A1−δ
t qδ
t (1 − xt)δ(1−α)  












(1 − τt − σt + ηtα )αz(τt+1,η t+1,θ t+1)α((1 − α)σt + αθt)δ(1−α).

           
           
(2)
Here, the function x(·) is implicitly deﬁned by the reduced ﬁrst-order condition characterizing
labor supply,
v (xt)(1 − xt)(1 − z(τt+1,η t+1,θ t+1)) =
1 − τt − σt − ξt
1 − τt − σt + ηtα . (3)
Note that labor supply in period t is independent of τt and σt if ηt = ξt =0 .
Conditional on initial values for the two state variables, (A0,q 0), as well as a sequence of
policy instruments, {¯ κt}∞
t=0, conditions (2) and (3) fully characterize the equilibrium allocation.
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(4)
where the deﬁnitions of fA(1 − xt(·),σ t,θ t)a n dfq(1 − xt(·),τ t,σ t,η t,θ t,τ t+1,η t+1,θ t+1) follow
from (the logarithms of) the laws of motion in (2).
Inelastic Labor Supply We will sometimes consider the special case with inelastic labor
supply, v (x) = 0. In this special case, the equilibrium conditions (2) maintain their validity,
but (3) is irrelevant and xt =0f o ra l lt. Moreover, since the instrument ξt then has no eﬀect
on the allocation, we can normalize it to zero, ξt =0f o ra l lt.
83.5 Balanced Growth Path
On a balanced growth path, all policy instruments are constant over time, implying that per-
capita labor supply is time-invariant as well. From (2), the growth rates of st, c1,t,a n dc2,t then
are equal to the growth rate of qt. Moreover, the laws of motion for the two state variables
in (2) imply that the gross growth rate of At, γA, must equal the gross growth rate of qt on a
balanced growth path. For any time-invariant choice of instruments, the last two equations in
(2) therefore pin down the ratio At/qt on the corresponding balanced growth path. Given this
ratio, the same two conditions pin down γA and thus, the balanced growth rates of qt,s t,c 1,t,





1 (1 − α)αδνδ(1−2α)(1 − x)δ(1−α)(1 − τ − σ + ηα )αδ ×
z(τ,η,θ)αδ((1 − α)σ + αθ)δ(1−α)
  1
1−α(1−δ) s.t. (3).
3.6 Dependence Among Policy Instruments
Inspection of (2) and (3) reveals that the ﬁve policy instruments are not independent of each
other:
Lemma 1. Consider a particular choice of contemporaneous policy instruments, ¯ κt =( τt,σ t,η t,θ t,ξ t),
that satisﬁes (1). Fix the policy instruments implemented in the following period, ¯ κt+1.L e t
At =( st,c 1,t,c 2,t,x t,A t+1,q t+1) be the contemporaneous equilibrium outcome implied by the
initial condition (At,q t), the policy instruments ¯ κt and ¯ κt+1, as well as conditions (2), (3). (The
latter condition only applies when labor supply is elastic.) Then, holding (At,q t)a n d¯ κt+1 ﬁxed,
the same At is implied by a diﬀerent choice of contemporaneous policy instruments, namely
¯ κ 
t =( τt,σ t − ηtα ,0,η t + θt,ξ t + ηtα ), where ¯ κ 
t also satisﬁes (1).
We can therefore normalize ηt to zero. Transfers from retirees to workers can fully be
replicated by lower worker contributions to public investment in combination with higher retiree
contributions to public investment and higher purely distortive labor taxes (this last component
to ensure that the choice of leisure remains unaﬀected). Let κt denote the set of independent
policy instruments in period t, κt ≡ (τt,σ t,θ t,ξ t), where we normalize ηt to zero from now on,
for all t.
94 Ramsey Policy
Before analyzing the politico-economic equilibrium, we characterize the allocation resulting un-
der the Ramsey policy. We assume that the Ramsey plan maximizes a weighted average of the
welfare of all current and future cohorts. Welfare of future cohorts is discounted at the factor ρ.
In all numerical examples, we assume ρ = βν, i.e., the Ramsey plan respects the time preference












s.t. (2),(3) for all s ≥ t, At and qt given.
Denoting a typical term in the objective function by πs,w eh a v e
πs ≡ β ln(c2,s)+ρln(c1,s)+ρv(xs)s .t. (2),(3)
= β ln[qs(1 − xs)1−α(α(1 − θs)+( 1− α)τs)] +
ρln[qs(1 − xs)1−α(1 − τs − σs)(1 − z(τs+1,0,θ s+1))] +
ρv(xs) + constant terms s.t. (3)
=l n ( qs)(β + ρ)+l n ( 1− xs)(1 − α)(β + ρ)+ρv(xs)+
β ln(α(1 − θs)+( 1− α)τs)+ρln(1 − τs − σs)+
ρln(1 − z(τs+1,0,θ s+1)) + constant terms s.t. (3).
Consider the direct and indirect eﬀects (the latter working through induced changes in qs)o n
the objective function that are triggered by a marginal change in one of the policy instruments,












ρi−t∂βln[α(1 − θi)+( 1− α)τi]+ρln(1 − τi − σi)
∂φi
+
ρi−1−t∂ρln[1 − z(τi,0,θ i)]
∂φi
,
10where the second and fourth lines only apply if i>tas they capture eﬀects of φi on choices in
the preceding period, i − 1.



































=( β + ρ)ρi−t  











where, by convention, matrices with a negative exponent equal zero. For the same reason as
above, the term ∂fi−1/∂φi only applies if i>t .
4.1 Inelastic Labor Supply
With inelastic labor supply, the expressions for the direct and indirect eﬀects on G(·) simplify
as xi is unaﬀected by policy changes. Several constellations may arise:
i. Interior optimum. An interior equilibrium in period t exists if κt solves any two out of
the three relevant5 ﬁrst-order conditions in period t with equality, and if it satisﬁes (1).
Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions in period t, we ﬁnd that τt and σt are functions of θt.
Evaluated at θt = 0, the tax rates are given by
τ =
β(1 − ρ − α(1 − (1 − δ)ρ2)) − αρ(1 − (1 − δ)ρ)




1 − (1 − δ)ρ
.
At those tax rates (but not the tax rates resulting when evaluated at θt  =0 ) ,a l lt h r e e















This condition need not hold for i>tthough.













for any κi,i > t .
11time-invariant tax rates θ =0a n dτ and σ given above constitute the interior solution to
the program. Depending on parameter values, these tax rates need not satisfy (1).
ii. Corner solution for τ. A corner solution for τi (but not σi and θi) arises if the constraint
τi ≥ 0 is binding, while the constraints σi + θiα  ≥ 0a sw e l la s1≥ τi + σi ≥ 0a n d
1 ≥ θi ≥ 0 do not bind. (Due to the dependence of the marginal conditions in period t (see
footnote 5) this constellation cannot arise in period t; while τt = 0, the constraint τt ≥ 0
does not bind.) This situation is characterized by τi = 0, together with the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to σi and θi holding with equality.
Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to σi and θi in period i and ﬁxing τi at zero,
we ﬁnd
σ =
β(ρα + α − 1)((δ − 1)ρ +1 )+ρ(2δρα − ρα + α − δρ)
(α − 1)(β + ρ)((δ − 1)ρ +1 )
,
θ =








α(β + ρ)((δ − 1)ρ +1 )
.
The time-invariant tax rates τ =0a n dσ and θ given above therefore constitute a solution
if ∂G(·)/∂τi < 0 at these tax rates. Depending on parameter values, this may or may not
be the case.




2α(β+1)(δ−1) , such that for ρ ≤ ρc the
interior regime applies, while for ρ>ρ c the corner solution regime applies. c2/c1 falls in
constrained region where θ>0.
5 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
Retirees and workers vote on candidates representing platforms with values for the four policy
instruments κt (no commitment, multidimensional policy space). Objective function derived
from probabilistic voting setup. Per-capita weights of retirees and workers are given by ω2 and
ω1, respectively. Let ω ≡ ω2/ω1. When determining the policy instruments to implement in
the current period, the political process anticipates the eﬀects on current and future equilibrium
outcomes, both economic and political. In a Markovian equilibrium, future leisure choice and
policy choices are functions of the state variables, xt+1 =˜ x(At+1,q t+1)a n dκt+1 = κ(At+1,q t+1).
Conditional on anticipated policy- and leisure-choice functions κ(·)a n d˜ x(·), the program
12solved by the political decision makers is
max
κt
W(At,q t,κ t;κ(·), ˜ x(·)) s.t. (1),
where
W(At,q t,κ t;κ(·), ˜ x(·)) ≡ ω ln(c2,t)+ν[ln(c1,t)+v(xt)+β ln(c2,t+1)]
s.t. (2),(3),A t and qt given,
κt+1 = κ(At+1,q t+1),x t+1 =˜ x(At+1,q t+1).
Economic equilibrium dictates that the anticipated leisure choice function ˜ x(·) is consistent with
the optimality condition (3), for any combination of state variables, i.e.,
˜ x(A,q) ≡ x(κ(A,q),τ(A ,q ),θ(A ,q ))
subject to the equilibrium law of motion of the state variables. Furthermore, political equilibrium
dictates that for any combination of state variables (At,q t), the κt solving the above program is
given by κ(At,q t).
Using the equilibrium expressions for consumption from (2), and omitting terms unaﬀected
by current and future policy choices, the political objective can be written as
W(·)=ω ln[(1 − xt)1−α(α(1 − θt)+( 1− α)τt)] +
ν{ln[(1 − xt)1−α(1 − τt − σt)(1 − z(τt+1,0,θ t+1))] + v(xt)+
β ln[qt+1(1 − ˜ x(At+1,q t+1))1−α(α(1 − θt+1)+( 1− α)τt+1)]},
where At+1 and qt+1 follow from (2) and xt solves (3).
In light of the fact that we found the tax rates under the Ramsey policy to be independent of
the state variables, we guess that the same holds true for the political equilibrium choices. (XXX
Uniqueness...) We verify this guess if we ﬁnd that constancy of κ(·) and thus, ˜ x(·)i m p l yt h a t
the κt solving the above program as well as the equilibrium labor supply are indeed independent
of the current state variables.
Imposing the guess and omitting terms unaﬀected by current and future policy choices if the
guess is correct, the objective function reduces to
W(·)=ω ln[(1 − xt)1−α(α(1 − θt)+( 1− α)τt)] +
ν{ln[(1 − xt)1−α(1 − τt − σt)] + v(xt)+
β ln[(1 − xt)δ(1−α)2+α(1−α)(1 − τt − σt)α((1 − α)σt + αθt)δ(1−α)]} s.t. (3).
13Omitting more irrelevant terms, the political objective function can now be written as
W(·)=ω ln[α(1 − θt)+( 1− α)τt]+
ν{ln(1 − τt − σt)+β ln[(1 − τt − σt)α((1 − α)σt + αθt)δ(1−α)]}.
The same reduced objective function results (under the guess) in the case with inelastic labor
supply.
5.1 Inelastic Labor Supply




βν(−θδ + δ + θ − 1)α2 +( βδν + ν + ω)(θ − 1)α + ω





(α − 1)δ(αθ − 1) − α2θ
 
− α(ν + ω)θ
(α − 1)((αβ(δ − 1) − βδ − 1)ν − ω)
.
θ is not pinned down. Shares, but not growth rate independent of θ. Growth rate maxi-
mized at θ =0 .
ii. Corner solution.
σ =
β(δ − 1)να2 − (2βδν + ν + ω)α + βδν + ω
(α − 1)((αβ(δ − 1) − βδ − 1)ν − ω)
,
θ =
β(δ − 1)να2 − (βδν + ν + ω)α + ω
α((αβ(δ − 1) − βδ − 1)ν − ω)
.
There exists a “critical” ν, νc(θ)=
ω(α(θ−1)+1)
α(αβ(δ−1)−βδ−1)(θ−1), such that for ν ≤ νc the interior regime
applies, while for ν>ν c the corner solution regime applies.
5.2 Elastic Labor Supply
5.3 Calibration
Our model allows for a direct estimation of the growth gap that can be attributed to the “political
failure” of decision making under majority voting. To this eﬀect we calibrate our model to
replicate the postwar growth performance of US economy. We set α =0 .2815; β =0 .48846;
7The condition given in footnote 5, with G(·)r e p l a c e db yW(·), applies.
14ν =1 .3843 the gross growth rate of the U.S. population between 1970 and 2000 (1.384).8 We
also set δ(1 − α)=0 .2, according to estimates of long-run elasticity of output to infrastructure
investment. This gives a political choice of τ =0 .121 and σ =0 .069. The Ramsey plan calls for
a much larger public investment, ﬁnanced both by the young and old. Taxes are θ =0 .187 and
σ =0 .367. If we calibrate B0 and B1 such that γA for the politico-economic outcome replicates
the actual US postwar productivity growth (which in annual terms is 1.26%), we ﬁnd that the
growth cost with respect to the Ramsey plan is a huge 1.55% per year.
8Piketty and Saez ﬁnd α to vary between 0.68 and 0.75 in post-war U.S. data. The population growth rate is
reported by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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